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FROM CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS




** Some notes to start off a discussion of Dworkin's claim that
judicial review is America's "Most Distinctive and Valuable Con-
tribution to Democratic Theory".
Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation
between politicalfreedom and a free market. I know of no example
in time or place of a society that has been marked by a large
measure ofpoliticalfreedom, and that has not also used something
comparable to a free market to organize the bulk of economic
activity.
Because we live in a largely free society, we tend to forget how
limited is the span of time and the part of the globe for which
there has ever been anything like political freedom: the typical
state of mankind is tyranny, servitude, and misery. The nineteenth
century and early twentieth century in the Western world stand
out as striking exceptions to the general trend of historical
development. Political freedom in this instance clearly came along
with a free market and the development of capitalist institutions.
So did political freedom in the golden age of Greece and in
the early days of the Roman era.
History suggests only that capitalism is a necessary condition
for political freedom. Clearly it is not a sufficient condition
Milton Friedman
I. Pros and Cons of the Politics of Judicial Review
(a) Protection from Capricious Governments
The principal argument made in support of the entrenchment
of a constitutional set of legal and political rights is that it means
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
** These notes are just that: notes. They form part of work-in-progress. My
colleague Judy Fudge and I are preparing a paper which will attempt to
evaluate what we perceive to be a distinctive movement towards the
embracement of the politics of the discourse of rights. Our hypothesis is
that, in Canada, this movement has been given impetus by the politics of
constitutional litigation, whereas in England the need to support this kind
of progressive politics has led to demands for constitutionally entrenched
rights. The paper which we hope to produce will overlap with the submission
I made at the Access to Justice Symposium, although we expect it to deal
much more detailedly with the politics of rights' discourse as advocated
by Hunt, Bartholemew, Laclau, Mouffe, et al, that is, with the matters
addressed in a preliminary, sketchy way at the end of these notes.
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that Canadians will no longer be at the mercy of the caprices of
governments, state institutions and/or government functionaries. The
courts will impose a check on unbridled power by reinforcing the
legal and political rights which now have been declared to be
fundamental. Previously, these same norms were part of our polity
but were not enforceable in this way. While they had developed
from modest beginnings to a relative state of richness and maturity,
this had not happened in any systematic way and there was no
guarantee that they would continue to be enlarged rather than
diminished. They had been part of our political culture and, as
super-structural things, remained malleable in the hands of govern-
ments, their agencies and institutions. Now they are no longer to
be subject to political whimsy. People can no longer be pushed
around just because they have different political or religious con-
victions. Courts will protect us from the leaden-weight of conven-
tional values and the primitive mob instincts which sway govern-
ments from time to time. They even may be able to perfect the
political and legal freedoms to which the constitutional document
says we are entitled as a matter of right. Judges, armed with
interpretative powers, may be able to give scope to the constitu-
tionally enunciated norms in such a way as to enable citizens to
enjoy a more meaningful political participatory political life. Our
courts can, and might, interpret our newly entrenched norms to
give us a richer, deeper democratic polity. A contrary set of
arguments, however, has been given voice.
(b) Democratic Institutions Versus the Courts
No matter how little we think of our existing democratic in-
stitutions, they are intended to be democratic. It is true that it took
us some time to become as democratic as we are. Full-blown adult
suffrage, which gave the vote to all sexes and all races, only became
a reality after World War II. Indeed, we only have had a universal
franchise since 1960 when status Indians living on the reserve
became eligible to vote in federal elections. But, today, every
Canadian has voting rights, independent of gender, race or wealth.
Governments are elected at the municipal, provincial and federal
levels. Between them they have plenary powers. These can be used
to restrain the would-be bullies in our society who might be in
a position to exercise dominium over others because of their private
wealth and strength. To ensure that other actors and agencies do
not overwhelm citizens, we have made our army, police forces and
public sector bureaucracies formally accountable to our elected
governments. We have a relatively educated citizenry. We under-
stand that it is to be kept informed. Many formal requirements
of disclosure have been imposed on governments. In addition, there
are strong conventions which require that public sector actors be
accountable to the public whose servants they are deemed to be.
There are formal legal rules and traditions which forbid cynical
self-dealing by public officials.
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While all too often the forms are better than the execution, the
intent is plain: the legal and political institutions are aimed at
furthering democratic practices. In addition, our developing sen-
sitivity for the plight of those who live differently, look different,
are physically differently equipped or have different customs and
beliefs, gradually has led us to impose obligations on both govern-
ments and private sector actors, forcing them to deal more equitably
in respect of differences. Given these positive developments, all
of which have been the outcomes of our electoral mechanisms and
public sphere activities, why would we entrust our future to an
appointed, electorally unaccountable institution such as the judiciary
which has never produced any analogous results? One of the answers
to this question is that the judiciary will now do better and that
it is not as unaccountable as it seems.
(c) The Failed Promises of Democratic Institutions
We have a right to expect, it is said, that courts will discipline
themselves by abiding by professionally developed methods of
reasoning. But the strength of this argument is diluted by the very
logic which underpinned the entrenchment of the Charter. Con-
stitutional judicial review has been chosen as a means to further
our political developments precisely because the judiciary is not,
as such, subject to the electorate, to any particular lobby group,
or to governmental influence. While it remains true that judicial
decisions may be reversed by parliaments, this can only be done
in extreme circumstances. The use of the 'notwithstanding' clause
will put politicians at risk. By contrast, its invocation will not impose
any loss on the judiciary as an institution or on the judges as
individuals. If the term 'institutional autonomy' means anything at
all, it has most weight when it is applied to the institution which
we call the judiciary. The idea, then, that the development of
participatory democracy should be left to this institution which is
not, in any serious way, subject to the discipline of democratic
politics smacks of the bizarre.
If one adds to this the fact that, traditionally,judges have supported
the views and beliefs of the dominant classes which, very often,
they have spent a lifetime serving before they were appointed to
the bench and, perhaps more importantly, that historically they have
had a deep disregard for the rights of workers and their collectives,
the argument againstjudicial review becomes quite persuasive. After
all, the nature, scope and extent of the legal and political rights
and freedoms to which the courts have to give life are ill-defined.
Much will depend on how the judges use their discretion and,
therefore, on their value system.
All of this negativism is countered by two arguments. The first
is that the institutions of liberal democracy, such as electoral and
group interest politics and a responsible government which has
ultimate control over enforcement agencies, are in a state of
catatonia or, worse, have been co-opted by anti-democratic forces.
Participatory politics isn't. People have insufficient access to, and
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increasingly are losing confidence in, the system. The rich and
powerful, however, are assured of access. This is leading to an
erosion of political pluralism, to the undermining of legal freedoms
and rights. In theory, our institutions are democratic; in practice,
they are not. We have nothing to lose, this argument goes, by trying
to add something to the mix. The second argument is the flip-
side of this crudely manufactured coin. It is that, while the courts,
in the past, even in the immediate past, may have been incoherent,
unimaginative and/or illiberal, armed - as they are - with a new
mandate, they are capable of being the vanguard of a political
and legal revolution. They will take the largely undefined rights
(or the unfilled balloons, as Peter Russell has called them so
felicitously), and give them meanings (or the air) which will enhance
democratic practices in Canada.
In theory, the negative view should have more sway because
it does not rely, at least not as much as does the rosy view of
the potential of judicial review, on leaps of faith based on ahistorical
and, indeed, antihistorical premises. But, this is only a debating
point. A better way to test the competing views is by looking at
outcomes. This requires qualitative judgments to be made. Neces-
sarily these will be coloured by the starting positions of the
evaluators. While the results in some cases have been positive, to
me it seems self-evident that, as yet, the results of judicial review
have not deepened Canada's democratic institutions and practices.
(d) A Preliminary Assessment of the Outcomes of Judicial Review
There is no particular reason to believe that Canadians now have
more in the way of concrete free speech rights than they did before
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enshrined. We have no
more right to public space in which to express our views than we
had. The owners of the mass media have given up none of the
virtual monopoly they have been able to exercise for such a long
time over the dissemination of news and opinion. Indeed, there
may be a greater concentration than there ever was, giving us,
the people, less freedom to express our opinions in reality than
we had before. On the other hand, it is true that some censoring
boards have been curtailed and that nazis have been able to get
much mileage out of their attacks on restrictive legislation which
seeks to inhibit the propagation of hatred. Eventually they lost,
but it is hard to know whether Canadians gained much by havi-ng
the legislation upheld. In the meanwhile, the corporate sector has
been able to establish that commercial speech is to be protected
by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as much as any other kind
of expression. It is also to be remembered that, in Lavigne, the
National Citizens Coalition has been able to raise serious doubt
as to whether a trade union can raise funds for political purposes,
a right which (like the 'prohibition of hate' legislation) was never
challenged before the advent of the Charter. While, in my view,
the National Citizens Coalition, in the end, will lose that case, its
unfavourable ideological impact is not to be underestimated. Unions
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have been forced to justify a political right which had been taken
for granted for years and, more importantly, they have been pressured
to use anti-working class arguments to justify their right to preserve
something which should be an unquestioned right in any mature
democratic society. In the Lavigne case, the union told the court
that collective bargaining was merely an aspect of buying and selling,
not unlike the purchase of paper clips and stationery.
Similarly, there is no evidence that Canadians today enjoy more
freedom of religion than they did before. At least one group of
people whose sincerely held religious beliefs dictated that their
children should undergo a non-conformist school experience were
not able to use the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to guarantee
that kind of education for their children. On the other hand, courts
have entertained the claims of corporations that they too should
be allowed to promote religious freedom. This has enabled the
corporate sector to attack laws designed to stop Sunday shopping.
Even more surprising is that the corporations have had a measure
of success. By comparison, unions which have sought to use the
Charter to protect themselves from governmental intervention with
their hard-won strike and picketing rights, as well as unions which
have sought to enhance their existing strike and free speech rights,
have failed. So far they have put such issues before the Supreme
Court of Canada seven times and have lost seven times (Glasbeek
1989, 1990, Beatty, 1991).
On the legal rights' front (ss. 8-14), the courts have produced
good language about the need to safeguard the integrity of the
administration of justice. In terms of results, it has meant increased
procedural protections for the rights of suspected people. They are
to be treated with respect by the executive and by the judicial system,
even if this means that the prosecution of some clearly guilty people
may fail. Evidence obtained by force, duress or unacceptable trickery
may be rejected. Many suspects have been able to raise defences
they otherwise may not have had. The right not to be subjected
to unreasonable searches and seizures has been given more teeth.
For example, suspects cannot be forced to give up documentation
of their affairs without judicial-like sanction. Violation of this rule
is said to constitute an unacceptable incursion into privacy. Suspects
are guaranteed the right to legal counsel and the right not to suffer
undue delays has been given concrete effect. Decisions have been
handed down which decree that accused people should not have
to disprove their guilt in any serious way whatsoever.
In the sense that these restrictions on the use of state power
might be teaching our enforcement agencies to be more civil and,
perhaps, to be more efficient, these are positive developments. It
is hard to say much more about them. The way in which the decisions
are made may be consonant with what the public would like to
see, although there is not much evidence that the public was unhappy
with the control exercised over the police forces before the coming
of the Charter. On a more concrete level, it is not clear that truly
innocent people were previously convicted and that now, in similar
1990
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circumstances, they are acquitted. Nor is it true that because some
obviously guilty people now are acquitted that we are a better
Canada or that now less people are subjected to our 'discipline
and punish' system. Canada now jails more people per 100,000
than at any other time in its history. The overwhelming number
of people in jail belong to the same classes as they always have:
the underclasses and the marginal working classes. Moreover, more
people are under state and state-delegated scrutiny and supervision
than at any other time in our history. Inasmuch as constructive
murder has fallen by the wayside or maximum penalties have been
declared unconstitutional, it is far from clear that sentences will
be lessened (Mandel). That is, better manners at the dining table
do not necessarily mean better food on it.
In any event, as Fudge has shown, there also have been roll-
backs on the legal rights' front (Fudge, 1989). Women have seen
some of the benefits furnished by rape shield laws, which they had
won by dint of legislative struggles, watered down by the courts
who used the Charter to restore the objectionable rules they had
created in the first place. The judges' argument, of course, is that
the accused, as an individual, requires protection from the state.
In a similar way, arguments about legal equality in respect of legal
rights has led the systemic oppression of women to be ignored
as the criminal law has been altered to do away with unequal
treatment of young males and young females in sex offence cases.
As a consequence of what is at best an equivocal set of outcomes
from the perspective of those who are optimistic about the potential
of the politics of judicial review, there has been a notable change
in position as they hang on to their hopes. There are two discernible
strands to their modified arguments in support of constitutional
rights' litigation.
II. Individualization and Decontextualization by the Politics of
Judicial Review
(a) Constitutional Litigation as a Force for Mobilization
Political activities around judicial review, even if enriched legal
and political rights are not the direct result of these activities, do
further political emancipation. They help make people aware of
the extent of their oppression, of their lack of rights. The denial
of an obviously rightful claim by a court can have a consciousness-
raising effect, especially if the court is imprudent enough to dismiss
the claim in a crude and ugly way, as too often is the case in
sexual assault cases. Moreover, the bringing of an action of this
kind requires the formation of an organization; networks need to
be established to raise money; a lot of pamphleteering is undertaken
and demonstrations are organized. The bringing of an action around
a particular concrete instance helps focus attention on existing
inequalities and disadvantages. In short, the constitutional enforce-
ment of rights through litigation is peddled as a useful organizational
and mobilizing device. This kind of argument, however, is plagued
by difficulties.
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(b) Liberal Ideology and the Judiciary
A quintessential feature of the politics of judicial review is the
particularity of the forum in which it takes place, namely, a court.
The processes are adversarial; the forms of argumentation limited.
One of the positive aspects is supposed to be that rationality, rather
than power or majoritarianism, provides the criteria for dispute
settlement. But, this also is the down-side of the scheme. The
objective facts which have led to the denial of rights in respect
of which the disadvantaged of the world complain are the results
of historical changes in material conditions in a class-divided society.
Generally, the nature of legal discourse draws a sharp demarcation
line between, on the one hand, the kinds of claims which may
be made in court and, on the other hand, the class relations and
historical developments which created the context for the claims
in issue. This is relatively easy to illustrate.
(i) Fault and the Fact of Insurance
In negligence cases, based as they are on fault principles, it is
well-known to every practitioner and, indeed, to every judge in
this country, that there is little point in bringing an action on behalf
of an injured person unless the defendant is extremely rich or insured.
Usually, individuals cannot pay compensation to the extent required
to make good even a relatively non-serious loss. Private insurance
is a sine qua non of the fault system. But, if it were known to
the public or, more especially, to the lay triers of fact, that an
insurance company was to pay for the losses of the plaintiff, there
would be pressure to find the defendant at fault, regardless of whether
or not the principles of fault warranted that. Judges have frequently
admitted that they give in to this pressure when they sit as triers
of law and of fact. But, the basis of the fault-based system is that
we are entitled to ask injured people to suffer hurt unless they can
find someone who was at fault. We want individuals to be made
personally responsible for their conduct so that they, and all of
us, will learn from their experience. Making them pay damages
when they deserve to do so is the way to achieve this purpose.
The fact of insurance, however, means that a faulty defendant is
not held personally responsible in any serious way because most
of the costs of his/her fault becomes a collectivized responsibility.
The individualistic basis for the retention of the fault system would
be delegitimated if this were known. The judiciary has done-its
best to obscure this reality which it comprehends fully. The fact
that either party is insured may not be mentioned in open court,
certainly not before a lay trier of fact. It is true that appellate courts
(including the Supreme Court of Canada) frequently refer to the
importance of insurance and, indeed, to the fact that the fault system
never achieves its objective of individualizing blame, but trial courts
never are supposed to let it influence their decision-making: they
are to hold fast to the idea that individual behaviour and individual
traits are at the centre of the dispute. If the artificiality of the
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argument is obvious, its intent is equally obvious; the idea is to
reify the creed of individualism, a legal individualism, one which
makes no reference to personal wealth or to class position. Dejure
equality of individuals is what the law is all about; material conditions
are of no interest to the courts who administer the common law,
that is, the non-legislative legal system.
(ii) Labour and Corporate Personality
A similar example is provided by the way in which corporations
are treated when litigants. The fact that a corporation is, by any
kind of non-legal definition (that is, by reference to any criteria
which accept reality), a collective, is completely ignored by the
law. For the law, the corporation is an individual, just like any
other human being. This means that when an individual consumer
is being sued by Bell Corporation the court deals with the case
as if it were private contractual matter between legal equals. Could
anything be more absurd? This legal distortion has particular
importance in labour relations law, that is, in the site of conflict.
Unionized workers who want to persuade their employer to give
them better conditions cannot withhold their labour in concert, that
is, strike, during the life of a collective agreement. Liberal democracy
being what it is, there is an equivalent restriction on employers
who want to have their workers accept different conditions during
the life of a collective agreement. They cannot resort to a halt
in production, that is, to a lock-out to achieve this aim. Stability,
then, is to reign, but not to such an extent that individual rights
are unduly abrogated. An employee can terminate a contract of
employment at any time, even if bound by a collective agreement,
provided she gives adequate notice of her intention to do so. After
all, it is an individual's fundamental right to determine whether
or not she will contract with any other individual. A fortiori, says
the law, an employer, as an individual, can terminate a contract
of employment at any time, even while bound by a collective
agreement, provided it gives adequate notice of its intention to do
so. The operative words are "it" and "its". The right of individuals
to end contracts belongs to corporations as well as to human
employers. Gone is the real-world notion that an employer, especially
a corporate employer, is a collectivity of inorganic and organic
assets. That is, while for collective bargaining law it is essential
that an employer is seen to be the counterpart of the union, thereby
treating each as collectives with, legally-speaking, equal collective
rights, this starting point is ignored when a corporate employer
purports to act like one of its single, individual employees. Formal
equivalence arguments posited on the precept that all individuals
(an expression which includes corporations) are dejure equals have
been permitted to erode the promise that something like true
countervailing power has been given to workers by legal policies
which legitimate trade unionism. The concrete outcome is that a
corporation can always threaten to leave in order to persuade its
workers to give it a better deal; the union and its worker members
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do not have that legal right. It means that employers can always
refuse to continue to invest or to invest anew, just like any employee
can refuse to continue to sell her property, her labour power. But
employees in concert can only do so under tightly controlled
conditions, for narrow economic purposes. Employers can do it
at any time, for any purpose. The capital strike for political purposes
by a corporation (a collective in the real world) is legally supported;
a workers' strike for political purposes is legally denied.
(c) Individualization/Decontextualization and the Public/Private
Distinction under the Charter
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms embeds this creed of the
individualization and decontextualization of disputes. When courts
are to deal with the Charter, the key to their starting position is
to be that, because all human beings are, as a matter of law, equal
sovereign actors, none are in a position to oppress any other by
dint of their privileged legal status, whatever they might be able
to do to each other by reason of their wealth. Under the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms the assumption is that, for the purposes
of constitutional rights, the state is the only potential oppressor
of individuals and that, therefore, the Charter ought not to apply
to the exploitation, oppression and discrimination of some private
sector actors by other private sector actors. Embedded in the Charter,
then, is a full replication of the classless society approach developed
by the judiciary over time, an approach which cements the power
of the ruling class by pretending it does not exist. Inasmuch as
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms purports to provide otherwise,
as it does by dint of the inclusion of section 1, this is only a mild
form of mediation. Giving litigants permission to show that at-
tempted breaches of their constitutional rights by governments are
not to be tolerated because they would not be acceptable as
reasonable limits on the freedoms and rights to be protected in
a free and democratic society does give litigants an opportunity
to put evidence and argumentation about class and history before
a court. But, it is only the state which has to justify its curtailment
of rights and freedoms, never the private sector. This is also true
when section 15 requires the state to show that its activity does
not exacerbate historically constructed discrimination. This makes
the vaunted equality provision much more problematic than its
boosters would like it to be.
It is the state's worsening or maintenance of inequality which
will be the issue; it is not the creation of such inequality by private
economic activities which will be the focus of criticism. The state
may not worsen privately created inequality directly, unless it has
an 'acceptable' reason for doing so. This is new. The state may
seek to alleviate privately created inequality. This is not new.
Governments always had this power for doing "good" but now
such endeavours can be challenged as unwarranted state interven-
tions with private rights. In short, inasmuch as materially constructed
exploitation and discrimination are to be the objects of attention
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of judicial review, they will only be so in an attenuated way. And,
because it is the state which is the object of attention and not the
private sector actors, any private sector actor can call the state
to the bar. This last point leads to a second and most telling argument
against the proponents of the politics of judicial review.
(d) Charter Rights as Movie Tickets - Equally Available to All
It is precisely because rights claimable under an entrenched
Charter of Rights and Freedoms are cast as abstract rights, that is,
as rights which are divorced from class and history and which are
to be imbued by the spirit of individual liberalism, that they are
available to all individuals in our society. It is this which explains
many of the results which must stick in the craw of proponents
of a Charter-type document, results which indicate that some
capitalists and, indeed capitalism itself, have profited enormously
from the politics of judicial review in Canada, although that was
not the declared intention. A quick survey of some decided cases
makes this plain.
Capitalists, in corporate guises, have been able to make successful
claims that, as sovereign individuals, like all other atomized in-
dividuals, they are entitled to enjoy the political right of freedom
of expression. Corporations must be permitted to speak. It follows
that they should be permitted to speak about politics. When the
National Citizens Coalition established that the government's at-
tempt to control electoral spending could not justify putting fetters
on corporate advocacy advertising, it cemented the otherwise frail
legal basis for the vote-clinching splurge of pro-Free Trade Agree-
ment advertising undertaken by big business in the crucial last stages
of the 1988 federal election campaign. One of the consequences
of the consummation of the Free Trade deal has been an ever
deepening deregulated polity, one in which the creation of social
and economic welfare is increasingly entrusted to private ordering.
Private greed and individualism are stars whose place has become
more fixed in the firmament of our political economy.
Our courts also have held that no firm line can be drawn between
political speech and economic speech and that, therefore, both should
be protected by the Charter. There is some irony in this as the
liberal state prides itself on the logic of the separation of the political
from the economic spheres. But, when it comes to the right to gabble
to peddle goods, this logic has had to take a back-seat. Advertising
the superior values of one type of toilet paper over another is
constitutionally as privileged as an essay on the inequity of the
skewed wealth distribution which allows 20% of Canadians to live
in poverty, or no less worthy of protection than a speech and march
to protest the repugnant nature of governmental decisions which
cause Canadians to be sent to defend U.S. imperial interests in
the Middle-East. This judicial approach to the meaning of freedom
of expression has had a plethora of effects, all of them adverse.
It is going to become increasingly difficult to regulate advertising.
The tobacco industry is about to test this proposition. Even if, in
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the end, the regulators win this and like cases, the Charter arguments
will have had an adverse, inhibiting effect. Where the private sectors
have the potential to bring down government regulatory schemes
by use of the Charter, governments tend to 'wait and see', to hesitate,
before they regulate and enforce. For instance, Ontario's government
is fighting in court to defend its right to prosecute efficiently as
corporations argue that strict liability offences violate the Charter.
The government may well win these cases in the end, although
Ontario's Court of Appeal already has found in favour of corpo-
rations in two such cases. In the meanwhile, governments are chary
of enforcing their own laws and are prone to 'clean-up' existing
regulatory schemes, just in case they might be challengeable under
the Charter (Ison 1985). The marketeers are given a boost.
To return to the thrust of this sub-section, all of this means that
the rampant deceptive nature of advertising is unlikely to be brought
under further control. The idea that we all must buy things in order
to be better people and that consumerism is the key to the creation
of more welfare will be furthered by every trick in the trade.
Advertising will become even more important than it already is
to the news media. As it is, 50% of our newspapers are filled with
advertisements of one kind or another and 80% of all newspaper
revenues are obtained from advertising (Glasbeek, 1986). The news
and opinions disseminated by our free speech-espousing media can
be expected to become ever more narrow in focus. Even more than
already is the case - and this will be hard to achieve - publishers
and editors and broadcasters will strive not to print the kind of
news and opinions which do not harmonize with their advertising
clienteles' values and needs. In short, the developments in freedom
of speech fought for by the corporate sector are leading to a lessening
of the public space available for expression by us, the masses, rather
than an increase. The scope of the abstract right of freedom of
speech has been expanded; the potential for exercising the right
concretely, if anything, has been diminished.
This is made even worse by the fact that the already high degree
of newspaper and media concentration is increasing. The almost
incestuous and pervasive interlocks between the media and other
big business corporations were well-documented by Clement some
time ago. It may be getting worse. It is not at all surprising, then,
that some of the Charter challenges to the regulation of competition
by government have emanated from the news media industries.
Southam, a corporation, was able to convince the Supreme Court
of Canada that regulators who wanted to discharge their respon-
sibility to prevent and punish anti-competitive practices should do
so subject to efficiency-impairing fetters. The argument of the Court
in Hunter v. Southam Inc. was that this protective shield claimed
by the corporation should be granted lest the privacy of its soulless
non-existing body be unjustifiedly disturbed. While the practical
impact of this decision was watered down by a subsequent decision
(Thomson Newspaper Ltd.), its ideological effect has not been
diminished. At another level, the Competition Act, whose stated
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purpose is to contain the levels of corporate concentration within
acceptable bounds, has been attacked by corporate actors who
employed the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to do so. The claim
of the corporate sector has been that the pristine right of an individual
to trade is imperilled by the statute. So far, the corporations have
had more success in making these kinds of Charter arguments than
labour has had. In one remarkable case, a judge at first instance
held that corporate mergers are protected exercises of the freedom
of association and cannot be interfered with by pro-competition
regulators. Even if, in due course, these decisions are overturned,
as is likely, and the very weak Competition Act is returned to its
former non-existing glory, the regulators will have been taught a
lesson they will not forget: they are to be extremely chary in their
use of the limited powers they have been given by the state to
control private capital's ambitions.
Corporations also have been able to use arguments which mere
mortals believe to deal with a quintessentially human characteristic,
namely, the freedom to practise a religion. Now, it is not true, of
course, that corporations have developed an interest in religious
beliefs. They have made clever use of the other-worldly, abstract,
nature of the Charter to claim that they, as righteous citizens, need
to be free from any government regulation in order to support the
religious needs of their shareholders, employees and customers. They
have been able to attack rules which forbid doing business on any
particular day. This is what the Sunday shopping case law is all
about: it reflects capital's desire to be able to sell goods at every
possible moment of every day. Courts have bought this bag of goods.
Add to this the judicial finding in favour of the National Citizens
Coalition which gave corporations the unbridled right to advocate
politically and the paradox of the politics ofjudicial review in Canada
is manifest. The courts, by their decisions so far, have helped to
reinforce a political and economic climate in which governments'
activities and decisions increasingly reflect the ethos of greed and
individualistic opportunism. This Charter-supported ethos inhibits
any enriched exercise of political rights.
Here a reassessment of labour's fate under the Charter is apposite.
Again, the bare results, as such, do not matter as much as the
nature of the cases which have come forward and the political
culture which the decisions promote. As to the results, Weiler has
pointed out that, in many cases, boards and courts have rejected
attacks on collective bargaining law made by private actors who
tried to use the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to undermine the
legislative scheme. The status quo, more often than not, he points
out, has been left intact. And, inasmuch as labour has been
spectacularly unsuccessful before the Supreme Court of Canada,
it is true to say, as he does, that labour has not actually lost any
legal rights that it did have; Canadian workers never have had
an unrestricted right to strike or to picket. Apologists for the Charter,
such as Weiler, therefore, argue that what this case law demonstrates
is that courts are showing an admirable amount of deference and
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restraint. They are leaving the nuts and bolts of the legislative
schemes undisturbed and rarely interfere with majoritarian decision-
making by governments which set out to curb existing labour powers.
But, this is an obtuse analysis.
The proponents of the politics of judicial review place a great
deal of emphasis on the educative and mobilizing effects of
constitutional rights' claims. The highest court in the land has said
emphatically that the right to strike is not a basic one, but that
the right to engage in trade is. What labour has been told repeatedly
by the Supreme Court of Canada is that the freedom to associate
has been granted only to advance individualistic political rights,
not those of a collectivity, and that the right to communicate on
behalf of the working classes can be, and should be, subjected to
the unfettered right of individuals to trade. The autonomous,
sovereign individual, not labour as a class, is to be the bearer of
rights and freedoms. And, inasmuch as these rights are undermined,
only the state is to be prevented from interfering with those
individualistic rights. That is, in this sphere, as in all others, the
aim has been to boost the liberal ideal of dejure equal individuals,
regardless of class and history. This was exactly what courts did
in the pre-Charter days when liberals who portrayed themselves
as labour-friendly scholars, people like Weiler, castigated them for
their incompetence, obdurateness and anti-working class biases.
Now this approach has been given more kudos: it is offered as
an integral feature of our efforts to breathe life into our fundamental
rights and freedoms. Instrumentally and ideologically this helps the
dominant groups in our society, not the disadvantaged ones.
(e) The Effect of Having to Legitimate all Judicial Decisions
For those who believe, as Dworkin does, that judicial review
is capable of making a major contribution to democratic practices,
it is essential that the judiciary's decisions be seen as being handed
down by an institution which is above the fray, untouched and
untouchable by existing political institutions which do not deliver
the goods. The judges are to make pronouncements about rights
and freedoms, regardless of the views of political power-brokers.
By itself this may not lead to needed changes. Institutionally, courts
cannot give life to their decisions directly; the allocation of resources
by governments may be needed to have their principled views
implemented. A holding that someone should get the same benefit
as another, or even a better one, might cause a government to
redress the wrong which the court has identified. On the other hand,
it might cause a government to abolish the award of the benefit
altogether.
What the proponents of the politics of judicial review are looking
for from courts, then, are declarations which support the liberal
ideals of political emancipation and equality. The impact of pro-
nouncements depends on the legitimacy of the declarants. For
judicial declarations to be able to shape and mould social relations
they will have to be seen as coming from an institution whose
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legitimacy will give those declarations a privileged political status
and, therefore, special resonance. The idea is that elected politicians
should have to pay heed and that activists who work on behalf
of the targets of discrimination, or the repressed, or the unwar-
rantedly differently treated, will be armed with powerful and hard-
to-resist political ammunition, namely, the language of universally
accepted rights.
From this vantage point it becomes understandable how con-
stitutional rights' proponents scour the pronouncements of the
appellate courts for favourable sounding statements and how, even
if the result in a particular case looks like a defeat for their clienteles
and/or their causes, a decision can be hailed as a victory because
it contains some nice sounding language. Michael Mandel has made
this point tellingly. He offers the story of the Cruise-testing case.
The decision gave constitutional sanction to Americans to test their
deadly weapons over Canadian soil. Yet, the case was treated by
those who opposed the missile testing in court as a triumph because
the Supreme Court of Canada had suggested that it had the power
to review executive decision-making by governments, even though
it also said that it was not likely to exercise this power often and
certainly not in the case before it. One of the lawyers who had
sought to use the courts to stop the Cruise flying over Canada
said: "It's a bad day for peace, but a great day for civil liberties"
(Mandel, 1983).
This approach to judicial review creates a problem. If the judges'
decisions and language are to be used as means to further progressive
politics, constitutional rights' proponents cannot afford to disparage
the judiciary when it reaches results and/or uses language which
are adverse to the democratic project. The legitimacy of the judiciary
cannot be undermined. If good results and language have to be
celebrated and given political effect, bad results and bad language
will be hard to attack, except in the judicial forum where judges
may politely, and in a decidedly 'non-political' (i.e. legal) fashion,
be asked to change their legal minds. The manifest difficulty this
creates for democratic advances is linked to yet another.
While some judicial readings of the Charter have raised the hopes
of its progressive proponents, there already are many bad results
and much bad language coming out of the courts. In particular,
as seen, Charter decisions have enhanced the naturalness and the
worthwhileness of the politically isolated, wealth maximizing in-
dividual; the value systems which accompany commodification,
commercialism and consumerism have been given a boost; anti-
collectivism and patriarchy have been endorsed. Now, as the politics
of judicial review require that the results, ideas and language which
emanate from the judiciary when it is cloaked in its constitutional
garb be supported, the values propagated by the courts may well
further persuade the subjugated in our society to accept, as natural,
the norms and values which already assist the dominant classes
in fortifying their position. That is, regressive values which already
are internalized may be fortified. To repeat: not all results and
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declarations coming out of the courts interpreting the Charter are
regressive but, to use the language of the rights' discourse debates,
the politics of counter-hegemonic thrust, based on the launching
pad of judicial review, may often backfire. It is, at least in part,
helping to embed the very conditions which it is supposed to
undermine.
This perspective on what may be happening as a result of the
political fights structured around constitutionally entrenched rights
and freedoms in Canada dovetails with the observation of Maureen
Cain. The terrain of struggle of constitutional rights' politics is the
legal forum, one in which lawyers play the leading parts. She
characterizes lawyers as conceptive ideologists. They are given a
highly politically charged dispute about rights to deal with and
reconceptualize it in order to fight it legally. In the process, they
deradicalize the struggle. Examples of this abound. In Lavigne it
was the oppressed - the workers and their unions - who had
to argue that the collectivist activity in which they had been forced
to engage because of the exploitive nature of the private ownership
of wealth was private activity, not different in kind to the private
commercial activity which creates the very harm they have to ward-
off. A similar scenario unfolded in Tomen, the schoolteachers' case
which involved the question of whether female teachers should be
entitled to retain their exclusive union to overcome historical
discrimination. The women relied on this feminist argument but
also on one which characterized their union activities as private
ones. Thus far, they have won on the latter point.
f) The connection between Friedmanites and constitutional rights'
proponents
What is clear is that judicial review, so far, has done much to
re-emphasise the social centrality of the political-economic indi-
vidual, to diminish the significance of class and history as bases
for decision-making, to reinforce the precept that the state is the
real locus of oppression and that economic freedoms of the liberal,
Adam Smith-type, are sacrosanct. That is, in many ways, the impetus
of judicial review under Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms
has been to drive towards a perfection of a view of the world which
the likes of Milton Friedman espouse.
Friedman argues that economic freedom is as fundamental to
freedom in its cosmic sense as political-civil rights' types of freedom.
He goes so far as to say that economic freedom, that is, the individual
right to trade with a minimum of interference from other private
actors and, especially from the state, is a pre-requisite for the
achievement of freedom writ large. He is careful enough, however,
to note that economic freedom, by itself, cannot ever be enough
to produce freedom in its larger sense. More is needed. Curiously,
it is at this point that the proponents of the politics of judicial




Positively, the judicial review politicians seek to perfect existing
liberal norms. The emphasis here is on 'existing'; after all, no one
doubted that these norms were accepted in Canada prior to the
coming of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In 1977, Hogg had
noted that "[i]t is a fact, however, that in Canada - as in the
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand - civil liberties are
better respected than in most other countries" and McIntyre J. was
quoted as saying: "If you had gone to the ordinary layman in the
street ten years before the Charter was even spoken about, listed
the rights that we were going to have and ask him if he was in
favour of it, he would have been horrified to think that he didn't
already have those rights." The quest, then, is to deepen the extant
liberal norms of freedom. What is notable is that this goal is not
being pursued at the expense of existing liberal economic freedoms.
These are not being challenged as such. While the results of judicial
review in Canada which have led to the increased protection of
commercial rights undoubtedly are regretted in the circles of rights'
proponents, the premises of economic freedom, of a liberal market
economy, are not challenged by them in courts. The constitutional
rights' terrain of struggle does not provide an opportunity for doing
this, as it separates the private from the public sphere. On the other
side of the coin, market precepts - unchallenged under the Charter
- insist that individualistic economic freedom is an important
individualistic political freedom. In the result, the ease of phrasing
a claim to this kind of freedom as a political freedom for the purposes
of a constitutional document such as the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms has permitted capitalists to go to courts to seek to boost
the scope and legitimacy of their individualistic free trade rights.
In this context, it is hard to see how judicial rights' proponents
can believe that their efforts to perfect liberal political rights will
lead to a better, more participatory democracy. That belief only
can be held with sincerity by them if, like Friedman, they think
that a classical free market economy is consonant with a democratic
polity, maybe even a necessary aspect of it. This is passing strange.
After all, it may be hard to achieve a truer democracy, one based
on greater equality in participation, if wealth distorts political
decision-making power. Here it is interesting to note that Milton
Friedman's own analysis admits that one cannot have both egali-
tarianism and liberalism. Hayek, another respected proponent of
the primacy of liberal economic freedoms to a society which aspires
to achieve true freedom, was even more forthright than Friedman
when he wrote that "we must face the fact that the preservation
of individual freedom is incompatible with the full satisfaction of
our views of distributive justice" (Hayek, 1949, p. 22).
This recognition of the limits of a liberal economic society by
its advocates is necessitated because capitalism has never delivered
anything but stark inequality. It is for this reason that the state
has been required to intervene to redistribute wealth and income
occasionally, and it is primarily for this reason that the state is
seen as the site of unfreedom by capitalists. The maldistribution
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of wealth found in modem capitalism may permit liberal norms
to hold political sway, but it does not favour equality in their actual
exercise. Attempts to redress this are characterized as violations
of those same liberal norms.
As Offe and Wiesental have noted, under feudalism the main
political struggle was to change the political norms, that is, to find
a way to make all people equal in the eyes of the law, so that
the rigidified inequalities acceptable to feudalism would come to
be seen as intolerable. This revolution was achieved as capitalist
relations of production replaced feudalism. Every individual was
now seen as being in the same legal-political position as any other
to maximize her economic opportunities. Socio-economic inequality
was no longer mandated by the legal-political norms. It could only
be justified if it was the result of individual merit, or uncontrollable
factors, such as luck. If, as always has been the case, huge inequalities
existed which could not be justified or explained on these bases,
something had to be wrong. This is where we are.
All of this suggests that what a well-known 19th century
sociologist once said might be true. Marx argued that liberal
capitalist thinkers turn reality upside down. The problem is not
that our liberal civil rights are impoverished because an arrogant,
autonomous state will not let them flourish, but rather that they
are confined 'n cribbed because capitalism will not permit them
to flower to full bloom. C.B. McPherson has argued that Friedman
is just wrong when he says that economic freedom is a prerequisite
for liberal democratic rights. Rather a measure of liberal democratic
rights was necessary to the development and establishment of
capitalist relations of production. Under capitalism, true democracy
and freedom is never possible because the system entails the
subjugation of the masses to the will of the propertied. This kind
of non-liberal or, better, anti-liberal, perspective is supported by
our socio-economic circumstances. After all, inequality is deepening
at the same time as legal-political liberalism is enjoying more state
support than ever before.
Fighting on the civil libertarian rights' front, then, might not be
the most sensible way to go. Perhaps the overthrow of capitalist
relations of productions should be the objective of democrats, of
freedom fighters. Engagement in a politics which deepens the
separation of the private from the public, the economic from the
political, may be precisely the wrong kind of politics because it
reinforces the disjuncture between the superstructural legal-political
sphere and the basic socio-economic one. The politics of judicial
review might have to be rejected because it is the kind of politics
which embeds these fissures.
IlI. From Constitutional Rights to the Politics of Rights Writ Large
(a) The logic of the politics of rights' discourse
Many progressive intellectuals are sensitive to the kernels of truth
to be found in the above arguments. But, rather than confront them
and deal with the possibility that the politics of rights are filled
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with danger, many of them tend to shift the ground of the debate,
opting for a different kind of rights' strategy.
As it is becoming clear that constitutional rights' fights and
litigation tactics simply are not bringing the results hoped-for,
progressive scholars who had anticipated better returns are mod-
ifying their position. People like Hunt and Bartholomew continue
to think that there might be some profit in constitutional rights'
fights but, given the uncertainty of this, they no longer put all their
eggs in that basket. The contention becomes that the constitutional
rights' struggles both directly support, and are ideologically sug-
gestive of, the positive possibilities of a larger kind of rights' politics.
Constitutional fights and litigation are not the only way in which
rights can or ought to be claimed. Rights also have a moral aspect,
one which resonates with the way people think about their lives,
their experiences and their oppressions.
Rights are hegemonic in nature because the subordinated classes
have internalized the rights' discourse of the dominant classes. If
a claim can be couched in the language of a hegemonic right,
therefore, the claim is more likely to find an echo amongst the
depressed and oppressed groups, making it easier to engage them
in the political action necessary to bring about a change of polity.
The idea is to engage in counter-hegemonic struggles. A claim
based on hegemonic rights is, by definition, compatible with the
dominant culture of the day and, thus, potentially, must be respected
by the ruling class. This can lead to the mediation of existing
conditions and might even have transformative capacity. So goes
the theory.
(b) Social movements
This theory is to be implemented primarily, it seems, by relying
on what are generically referred to as the new social movements.
The social movements of today seem to be new in the sense that,
unlike those of the late 19th and the early 20th century, they do
not seem to be as intent on obtaining power through the state in
order to change the social and economic relations of the political
economy. Rather, they draw on those aspects of the movements
of the '60's and '70's which had in them the elements of the politics
of identity. Kaufman and Epstein suggest that the new social
movements attempt to change values and beliefs by engaging in
a different kind of politics, by emphasising certain anti-state
aspirations, rather than by engaging in the more traditional politics
of social movements of both the immediate and more distant past
which sought to obtain power through gaining control over the
public domain.
New social movements are characterized by their opposition to
a number of forms of subordination, such as racism, sexism, classism
and heterosexism. They seem to reflect the desire to come to grips
with the fragmentation of our social reality, a reality which can
no longer be described by the 'simple' theoretical paradigm of years
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gone by of conflict between the ruling class and the ruled, that
is, the paradigm of class analysis.
The cleavages between people based on sexual preferences,
gender, colour, creed, and so forth, are becoming ever more obvious
and constitute a powerful argument for a politics of culture and
identity. The logic of that argument is that of commentators, such
as Laclau and Mouffe, who have criticised the notion of a unitary
subject, that is, of a single identity which can serve as the basis
for political activity. This approach is reflected in both the literature
and daily politics. The moral rights'/new social movements' theo-
reticians reveal a positive bias for movements with a specific
constituency such as women, gays and lesbians, people of colour,
and the like. On the other hand, it needs to be noted that new
social movements also include large-scale, less focussed groupings
such as environmentalists, the peace movement, the anti-nuclear
activists, all of which tend to appeal to a broader notion of social
responsibility than do the movements which act on behalf of separate
cultures, values and identities.
This is a rude and crude way to describe the sophisticated
scholarship which deals with the new social movements/rights
discourse theories. But, here the point is that, despite its many
refinements, the literature leaves a number of questions unanswered.
It appears that the new social movements rights' discourse theories
start off on the assumption that there is no one particularly privileged
theoretical way of looking at the world. It is true that many of
the rights' discourse scholars, including Laclau, Mouffe, Hunt and
Bartholomew realize that there is a dominant scheme - capitalism
- which inhibits true democracy from developing. But, this ac-
knowledgement is not all that satisfying given the kinds of pre-
scriptions their writings offer. The strategies of moral rights' claims
they advocate will not necessarily lead to a different set of relations
of production. In a very real sense, the proponents of moral rights'
claims, primarily to be pushed forward by the new social movements,
replicate some of the difficulties created for progressive politics
by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
(c) Moral Rights' Claims - Replication of the Judicial Review
Problem?
We saw that many difficulties for Charter politics stemmed from
the fact that the claim to a constitutionally embedded abstract right
and freedom can be made by anyone and, in the result, the dominant
class may be able to reinforce its control over social and economic
relationships. This is the clear and present danger of the politics
of judicial review. In the same way, the problem of identifying
why one cultural group or identity, or one set of values and
aspirations, is 'better' than any other, permits any group to classify
itself as a social movement which can make a moral right claim
as validly as any other self-defining group. Why is one movement's
moral rights' claim better than another's? How is one to distinguish
a group of women and men who espouse traditional family values
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from a group which proposes reproductive choice and independence
for women? The argument of progressive moral rights' discourse
proponents, then, must be that there is a valid way in which to
determine which new social movements are to be promoted and
which ones are not. Inherent in their argument there must be a
notion of a hierarchy of values, aspirations, cultural and identity
claims. Yet, no criteria to devise such a hierarchy seem to be
provided, except that democracy, equality, liberty and justice must
be enhanced.
Perhaps the argument is that the mere fact that there is a need
to establish an acceptable hierarchy is in itself conducive to
progressive politics because the issues will have to be brought out
into the open and to be fought about. If that is the claim, it is
hard to see why rights' discourse politics is very different from
any other kind of politics, that is, why it is that it has any particular
significance.
If the contention is that to cast claims in terms of 'rights' is
a good strategy then all the theorizing on offer is beside the point.
There is nothing new in the argument that hoisting the rulers on
their own petard, to stick them with their own hypocrisies, is a
good tactic. Indeed, it provides progressives with a sensible defence
for their participation in the more limited constitutional rights'
litigation politics. But, as seen, the use of that tactic in that sphere
may be back-firing or, at least, misfiring. Some strategies lead to
wins, others to losses. This is obvious, but it is a point worth making
because, if the politics of moral rights' discourse is merely about
strategies, they are strategies with an Achilles heel. They tend to
downplay the importance of struggles at the site of production.
The point being made is not that class theory explains everything
in our society. The proposition that everything turns around the
struggles which arise over the ownership of the means of production
is not a useful way to attack the problems of systemic inequality
and discrimination. Oppressions on the basis of race, nationality,
ethnicity and sex are not mere proxies for the oppressions which
arise from the exercise of power by the owners of the means of
production. For instance, feminist scholarship has established that
patriarchy has a history which antedates capitalism. The nature
of the relationship of class and patriarchy (or race) remains a subject
of much debate, but there is no a priori reason to attach more
importance to class than to, say, patriarchy, in the formulation of
an explanatory theory of how social relations are constructed and,
therefore, as to what strategies are to be preferred over others to
do away with existing forms of repression (Parr). From this
perspective, the open-ended nature of the arguments offered by
the politics of rights' discourse theoreticians is not a failing. It can
be seen as an acknowledgment of the fact that there is no easy
way to determine what rights' claims ought to have preference over
any other. All that should be expected from these people is a
recognition that, for strategies to be effective, it is crucial to develop
an understanding of what is at the relevant time most central to
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the power struggles between the advantaged and the disadvantaged.
As Adamson, Briskin and McPail put it when they sought to identify
how power was working itself out in various terrains of contest
- class, race, gender and sexual orientation -
Itihe relative strength and import of these relations to groups,
individuals, and political practices is determined within the context
of particular historical conjunctures. This means that the prioritizing
of issues, a necessity to successful political struggle, must not occur
on the basis of abstract principle .... but rather in relation to material,
economic, political and ideological conditions. (p. 109)(My emphasis).
The social movements' and political rights discourse theorists
are sensitive to this point in principle. But, in fact, their writings
do show a preference, albeit a negative one: they pay little heed
to the potential for transformative struggle in the workplace. This
could be justified on the basis that, at this point of our history,
the working class, as such, is not to be seen as the natural agency
to bring about necessary radical change. But, if this is the argument,
it should be made in full. The logic of capitalist relations of
production points to working class struggles as a crucial element
of any transformative project. Yet, in general, the politics of rights'
discourse literature does not seem to see the force of this point.
Indeed, it not only rejects the idea that class theory should enjoy
a privileged position but tends to frown upon classism. In the result,
some obviously important material conditions seem to be ignored.
This is fraught with peril for the transformative project they support.
(d) Contemporary facts and the politics of rights' discourse
Despite all the new technologies, despite all the arguments that
soon there will be no proletariat left at all, there are in fact more
people working now than at any other time in our history. Moreover,
they work for longer hours, get less pay and have less job security
than they did even a short 10 years ago.
The cornerstone of the post-war arrangements in advanced
industrialized countries, the notion of a family wage, has gone by
the wayside, although the ideology which sustains it and which
it spawns, persists. There is a crisis of distribution as it is now
openly acknowledged that the male, well-paid unionized worker
can not bring home sufficient to provide for the family. (Acker)
Women, children and elderly people are being driven into the work-
for-wages workforce at an accelerating rate, looking for full-time
jobs with lowly developed skills and getting only part-time em-
ployment without benefit packages. Workers who once had rel-
atively well-paying secure jobs are losing them or are under threat
of losing them. They seek to hang on to their privileges. They often
feel upset by environmental and anti-war politics, precisely because
their livelihood and security are being affected. Pre-existing racism
and sexism are nourished in this milieu and are exploited by
capitalism. Chasms are deepened between working-class peoples.
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As Sivanandan argued, there are material reasons for the increase
in fragmentation to which the new social movements and rights'
discourse theorists are so sensitive. It seems somewhat peculiar,
therefore, he notes, to seek to transform political life by not
confronting the economic structures which enable the economically
powerful to exploit the differences directly. To wage the kind of
struggle he advocates successfully, it is necessary to have the many
fragments of oppressed people identify what they have in common.
Their relationship to the work-for-wages sphere may be a most
important link. Acceptance of this elemental fact might provide
the new social movements and rights' discourse proponents with
a possible way to deal with the question which troubles them, namely:
why is there any reason to believe that making moral rights' claims
on a variety of unconnected fronts will lead to progressive, let alone
transformative, politics?
It might have been reasonable to expect that the new social
movements' and moral rights' theorists would embrace the notion
that the struggles they advocate should be led by the working classes.
After all, much of the counter-hegemonic theorists' work is derived
from, and is justified by reference to, Gramsci. Yet, Gramsci had
made it clear that the counter-hegemonic struggles he envisaged
needed leadership and that the working classes were the natural
leaders of connected struggles. This aspect of his theory seems to
have disappeared from the new social movements' and moral rights'
theorists' arguments. At best, working class struggles are seen by
them as just another form of social movement, certainly not a
privileged one.
(e) The apparent futility of old-time class struggle
The cold-shouldering of working class politics is understandable.
The working classes, especially in North America, have been led
by a trade unionism which certainly has not sought to challenge
dominant groups and has done much to continue the suppression
of the culture, identity, values and aspirations of differently placed
groups in our society. Further, the union movement has not been
in the forefront of anti-war movements, nor of struggles to relieve
the plight of the third world workers, and it has often set its face
against environmentalism. Given all this, the idea that the working
classes are to provide leadership for true change must ring hollow.
Further, the collapse of working socialism in the eastern block only
leads to a deepening of the belief that class warfare, in its marxian
sense, is not worth fighting. All of this is exacerbated by the fact
that there seems to be little support even for unionism of the kind
which we have had in North America. Further, respected socialist
thinkers, such as Przeworski, have mounted impressive arguments
to show that the ideals of socialism may be unattainable.
He points out that governments which came to power as socialist
governments always have had, and will have, difficulty in main-
taining a commitment to a socialist agenda. Firstly, they have to
deal with the potential of a capital strike. This trims their sails.
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Secondly, there is a limit to nationalization projects, precisely
because it is hard for those governments to see how to use the
expropriated assets in a competitive setting which spans the globe,
a difficulty which looms particularly large in their view because
of the potential capital strikes which might be launched to avert
nationalization in the first place. Thirdly, it is difficult to rule
electorally without the approval of some segments of the population
which do not belong to the working classes. When in power,
therefore, would-be socialist parties very quickly become parties
which govern on behalf of the whole of the electorate, blunting
their socialist ideals. Fourthly, even if the difficulties of a capital
strike and its impact can be overcome somehow, there is yet another
problem: how will workers who have been endowed with job security
and a good social security net be given the necessary incentives
to produce enough welfare for the nation to run at a sufficiently
generous, bountiful level to warrant its maintenance? Fifthly, even
if all these difficulties are overcome, it still does not mean that
wage labour can be or will be abolished. And, even if it is, there
is nothing in the scheme itself which suggests that the freed citizenry
will behave in a truly socialistic fashion, that is, without engaging
in unacceptable discriminations and oppressions.
These are formidable points and they suggest that support for
a political project based on the achievement of socialism by wresting
control over the state away from the ruling class, given its difficulties
and dangers, is not a worthwhile project, particularly as the
establishment of socialism will not necessarily do away with
patriarchy or racism, even though much of its supporting net will
have been removed.
From these perspectives, the attraction of the politics of social
movements and of rights' discourse to change values in respect
of identity and culture is enhanced. After all, some positive results
can be obtained by fighting on these fronts. But, this line of
argumentation ignores the brute realities of our life and at least
one important theoretical understanding. Here I take up an argument
offered by Ellen Meiksins Wood.
She argues that capital is not inherently discriminatory, although
it is inherently fragmenting. It makes use of patriarchal discrim-
ination; it exploits racial differentiation. But, it does so because
it is a way of covering up the fact that capitalism always creates
inequality and under-classes. Justifications are provided by treating
patriarchy, sexism and racism as discrete spheres and as separate
causes for the establishment of classes of disadvantaged, oppressed,
repressed and under-classes. Capitalism is capable of accepting a
lot of mediation of these ugly discriminations without losing any
of its powers. Other means of justifying the exploitation and the
extraction of surplus value may have to be found, but the system
is quite inventive.
Now, social movements, and the making of moral rights' claims,
may help to soften uglier features of, say, gender and race dis-
crimination. At the end of the day, however, this kind of politics
1990
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of transformation is likely to leave capitalism intact. As long as
there is no direct attempt at doing away with capitalist relations
of production, people will remain unfree and unequal. The social
and economic inequality which capitalism mandates will not be
obviated.
09 The blind spots of the politics of rights: class and law
The problem left by the politics of judicial review have emerged
again. Freedoms of a civil libertarian kind can, and might, be better
ensconced if the social movements do find (to use Laclau's term)
some "equivalences", if they manage not to run in opposite
directions. This is not guaranteed, just as the politics of judicial
review are failing to ensure that only progress, democracy and
equality-pursuing actors will use the Charter to positive effect. Still,
progress might be made and, if it is, the norms of liberal capital
democracy of a politically and legally equal society will be abided
by better than they are at the moment. But, how will this translate
into greater social and economic equality?
Presumably the arguments that political rights of the disadvan-
taged gain more resonance through counter-hegemonic struggles,
the oppressed and repressed will seek to use their political rights'
claims to get concrete rights. After all, the reason these movements
exist and can mobilize people is that the lack of socio-economic
equality is hurting them. Their fight to enrich the existing norms
of civil rights, it must be hoped, will lead to an attack on the economic
system which exploits fragmentation.
This scenario is plausible and it is appealing because it starts
off by recognizing that political and civil oppression and discrim-
ination lead to material deprivations which must be addressed.
Further, social movements of one kind or another are always forming
and re-forming. The impetus is there and the rights' discourse
theorists gain credibility by giving intellectual support to spontane-
ous political activities. Yet, difficulties remain. First, and to repeat,
the theorizing is abstract in nature; there is nothing in it which
explains why the various social movements should coalesce. In the
absence of coherent, solidaristic politics, each grouping may be
forced to pursue its own interests, perhaps at the expense of other
equally disadvantaged people. Second, and relatedly, precisely
because the centrality of class is not only denied by the rights'
discourse advocates but seemingly considered less important than
issues of, say, gender, race or social orientation, it may well be
that individual social movements informed by an approach which
eschews classism only can make advances by exploiting other
groups. For example, male workers may feel pressured into opposing
women's rights both in relation to job rights and in their efforts
to make the problematic of the family as a discrete, private sphere,
a site of struggle. Or, unionists under attack may allow themselves
to be co-opted by xenophobic groups who want to treat immigrants
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and ethnic minorities in an unacceptable way. That is, fighting for
material needs on the basis of identity and culture, without a wholistic
theory, may well perpetuate fragmentation. If, as a matter of theory,
class analysis is not an acceptable framework, relegating it to the
bottom of the hierarchy of relations may have serious adverse effects
at a time when capitalism can exploit the fragmentation of the
working classes more efficiently than at any other time this century.
Third, a point which brings us back to the constitutional litigation
of rights. The political discourse of rights takes off where the
arguments about constitutional rights end and, therefore, the fact
that the litigation route has not proved all that successful is not
seen as a serious obstacle by the theorists. But, should they be so
sanguine?
Capitalism has become more and more effective, in its quest to
split the economic from the political, the private from the public.
As the first part of this paper shows, law has played a prominent
part in the development of a politics which allows an enrichment
of abstract civil, individual rights, while tolerating an ever-deepening
inequality in socio-economic conditions (Glasbeek & Mandel). Now,
the social movements which are to make the counter-hegemonic
rights' claims do not simply want their civil rights recognized. They
want to be able to enforce them concretely. The most obvious way
to do that in the modem capitalist state is to obtain positive legal
declarations which can be legally enforced. Litigation strategies
are not theoretically essential to the politics of rights but, practically
speaking, they will be central to them. If law, particularly in its
constitutional rights' garb, is as integral to the hegemony of capital
as this paper posits, the social movements' rights' discourse advocates
have a grave problem. Much of the political agitation they want
to promote will take place in the legal domain. The strategy of
counter-hegemony may founder on the hegemonic block created
by law.
In sum, the politics of the new social movements' and moral
rights' theorists - advocated for the most part by intellectuals of
the left - may, like the politics of judicial review, be the politics
of despair. The politics they propose are appealing because of their
sensitivity to identity and culture and their respect for self-
determination. They are principled, laudable politics. But, they tend
to overlook class theory too much. It is easy to be sympathetic
to this blind spot, because, right now, the overthrow of right wing
governments in England, the U.S.A. and Canada, let alone of
capitalism itself, seems so difficult. Yet, the struggles their theorizing
supports may be limited in their effectiveness because of this and
because there is nothing to show how the barbed-wire hurdle of
capitalist law can be cleared. The expression 'movements' which
they like so much is significant. It should be remembered that while
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